Missouri Law Review
Volume 69
Issue 4 Fall 2004

Article 16

Fall 2004

EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology:
The Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement
Jennifer A. Davis Foster

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennifer A. Davis Foster, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The Supreme
Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 MO. L. REV. (2004)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/16

This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Foster: Foster: EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology:

Notes
EPA Oversight in Determining Best
Available Control Technology: The Supreme
Court Determines the Proper Scope of
Enforcement
Alaska Departmentof EnvironmentalConservation v. EPA'
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1977, the Clean Air Act 2 did not purport to regulate the quality
of air in regions of the United States that met or exceeded national ambient
air quality standards 3 ("NAAQS") in any different manner than those regions
in which the air was particularly dirty.4 Although Section 101(b)(1) of the
1970 Amendments5 to the Clean Air Act stated that the preeminent purpose
of the Act was "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public heath and welfare," 6 the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") did not implement regulations designed to protect "against significant deterioration of the existing clean air areas" until
1974. 7 The initial regulations required that the states ensure the continued

I. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004).
2. The "Clean Air Act" refers to 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
3. NAAQS are set by the EPA to establish the "maximum permissible concentrations of air pollutants." Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 346 (D.C. Cir.
1979). The NAAQS are pollutant-specific, and the EPA sets these threshold standards
on criteria pollutants that are particularly harmful to the public health and welfare. Id.
States then implement and enforce the NAAQS through state implementations plans
("SIPs") approved by the EPA. Id. Within a state's SIPs, the state must implement a
strategy for attaining the NAAQS within each Air Quality Control Region ("AQCR")
located within the state. Id.
4. Id. at 346-47.
5. The 1970 Amendments were the first major attempt by Congress to federally
regulate air quality across the several states by mandating enforcement of NAAQS set
by the EPA. See 3 MARK SQUILLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR POLLUTION 47 (2d
ed. 1992).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000). This language has remained unchanged since
the 1970 Amendments.
7. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 254 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per
curiam without opinion, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,656 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
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maintenance of air quality in clean areas despite the fact that these areas did
not violate any federal pollution emissions standards!
In the 1977 Amendments, Congress explicitly created a new framework
"for maintaining air quality in those regions which are in compliance with the
national standards." 9 Known as "Prevention of Significant Deterioration"
("PSD"), these statutory provisions' ° require that any new or modified "major
emitting facility"" in an attainment area apply for a preconstruction permit
showing that emissions from the source "will not cause, or contribute to, air
pollution in excess of. . . maximum allowable increase or maximum allowable concentration for any pollutant."' 12 Under the PSD program, stationary
sources13 must demonstrate that "the proposed facility is subject to the best
available control technology for each pollutant subject to regulation ... emitted from ... such facility."' 14 The best available control technology ("BACT")
determination for any new or modified stationary source is made on a caseby-case basis by the state permitting authority "taking'' 5 into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs."
In both the Clean Air Act generally and the PSD program specifically,
Congress granted the EPA a large oversight function to ensure that states
acted in compliance with the terms of the statute. 16 According to the terms of

8. Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 347.
9. Solar Turbines v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir. 1989). The 1977
Amendments essentially divided the country into "attainment" and "non-attainment"
areas with different regulations for air quality attendant to each category. See Ala.
Power Co., 636 F.2d at 349. Area classification is pollutant-specific so "the same area
may be a clean air area due to the air quality with respect to one pollutant, yet be a
non-attainment area with respect to another pollutant." Id. at 350.
10. The relevant provisions detailing the PSD requirements for attainment areas
are found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (2000). These provisions have remained virtually unaffected by subsequent amendments to the Clean Air Act and still operate as
detailed in the 1977 Amendments. SQUILLACE, supra note 5, at 173.
11. The statutory definition of "major emitting facility" found in the Clean Air
Act includes "stationary sources of air pollutants which emit, or have the potential to
emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant from... [particularly
designated sources and] any other source with the potential to emit two hundred and
fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant." 42 U.S.C § 7479(a).
12. Id. § 7475(a)(3) (detailing the statutory requirements for permit authorization).
13. Id. § 7411 (a)(3) (defining "stationary source" as "any building, structure,
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant").
14. Id. § 7475(a)(4).
15. Id. § 7479(3). The technological requirements must be detailed in the state's
State Implementation Plan ("SIP") to ensure compliance with the PSD program. Id. §
7471.
16. See id. §§ 7477, 7413(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available
to the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/16
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the PSD permitting program, the EPA is authorized to "take such measures,
including issuance of an order... as necessary to prevent the construction or
modification of a major emitting facility which does not conform to the [PSD
permitting] requirements." 1 7 As discussed in this Note, the United States Supreme Court recently clarified and expanded the scope of the EPA's PSD
oversight and enforcement authority in Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservationv. EPA.' 8
In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the EPA was authorized to bar construction of a new major emitting facility where it found the state permitting
authority's BACT determination unreasonable.' 9 The Court held that, given
the legislative history and plain language of the enforcement provisions contained in the Act, the EPA has the authority to force compliance with the PSD
program where the EPA reasonably believes that the state permitting authority has acted arbitrarily in determining BACT. 20 This Note explores the
analysis employed by the Court and argues that, in light of the underlying
purpose of the PSD program, the Court in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservationreached the correct conclusion.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc. ("Cominco") operates the Red Dog Mine in
northwest Alaska, located approximately one hundred miles north of the Arctic Circle.21 The mine is a major producer of zinc concentrates and zinc material and is the largest private employer in the area. 22 Given the remote location of the mine, it relies on independent on-site power sources in the form of
electric generators to facilitate its daily operations.23 The mine is located in an
attainment area for nitrogen oxide,24 so it must abide by the PSD permitting
requirements of the Clean Air Act.
Clean Air Act with respect to construction of a new source or modification of an
existing source).
17. Id. § 7477. See also Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct.
983, 993-94 (2004).
18. 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004).
19. Id. at 991.
20. Id. at 1000.
21. Id. at 994.
22. Id. The mine supplies approximately one-quarter of the region's wage base.
Id.
23. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814, 816 (9th Cir.
2002), affd, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004).
24. Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 81.302 (2004) (detailing attainment and nonattainment areas for specific pollutants in the state of Alaska as required by the Clean
Air Act); Id. § 51.166(b)(23)(i) (requiring a PSD permit for facilities that increase
nitrogen oxide emissions in excess of 40 tons per year).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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In 1988, Cominco obtained an initial PSD permit from the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation 25 (the "State") for authorization to
operate the mine and five electric generators needed for on-site power. 26 The
State subsequently issued a second PSD permit to Cominco in 1994 which
authorized construction of a sixth generator to help power the mine's operations. 27 In 1996, Cominco instituted a plan to significantly increase its zinc
production and in 1998 applied for a PSD permit "to allow.., increased electricity generation by its standby generator." 28 After reviewing the initial per29
mit application, the State proposed Selective Catalytic Reduction ("SCR")
as BACT for the generator that Cominco planned to take out of standby
30
status. Cominco responded by amending its permit application to propose
addition of a seventh generator at the plant and "to propose as BACT an alternative control technology--Low NOx--that achieves a 30% reduction in
nitrogen oxide pollutants." 3' Cominco suggested that it could lower its total
emissions of nitrogen oxide at the mine by retrofitting the existing generators
with Low NOx technology and using this technology on the new generator as
well. 32 Cominco stated that SCR was not economically or technically feasi25. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, acting for the State
of Alaska, is the permitting authority for Alaska according to the state's SIP. See
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Alaska, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,284
(Apr. 26, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
26. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 994. "The mine's PSD
permit authorized five 5,000 kilowatt Wartsila diesel electric generators, MG-i
through MG-5 .

. . ."

Id. These generators were subject to operational limitations, as

two of the generators were relegated to standby status. Id.
27. Id. The 1994 permit also imposed "a new operational cap that allowed all but
one generator to run full time." Id.
28. Id. The State required Cominco to apply for a new permit because the increase in production and attendant need for increased generator power would cause
the mine to increase its emissions of nitrogen oxide by more than forty tons per year.
Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(23)(i) (2004) (requiring a PSD permit for Alaskan
facilities that increase nitrogen oxide emissions in excess of forty tons per year).
29. "SCR requires injections of ammonia or urea into the exhaust before the
exhaust enters a catalyst bed .... The reduction reaction occurs when the flue gas

passes over the catalyst bed where the [nitrogen oxide] and ammonia combine to
become nitrogen, oxygen, and water." Alaska Dep 't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S.Ct.
at 994 n.5. This technology reduces nitrogen oxide emissions by approximately 90
percent. Id. at 994.
30. Id.
31. Id. Low NOx technology involves changing the generator itself "to improve
fuel atomization and modify the combustion space to enhance the mixing of air and
fuel." Id. at 994 n.6.
32. See id. at 995; Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814,
817 (9th Cir. 2002), afjfd, 124 S.Ct. 983 (2004). This proposal would only truly create commensurate emission levels with SCR technology if Cominco permanently
relegated at least one generator to standby status. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S.Ct. at 995.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/16
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ble, which is a factor that the permitting authority is permitted to take into
account in determining BACT for a particular source.33
In issuing its first-draft technical report in response to the amended permit application, the State first stated that SCR was "the most stringent technology" for Cominco's fifth and seventh generators and that it was both economically and technically feasible for installation on the generators at issue. 34
The State also recognized that if the mine ran all seven generators simultaneously, the Low NOx proposal submitted by Cominco "would increase emissions by 79 tons per year. 3 5 Despite these findings, the State endorsed the
Low NOx technology proposal submitted in Cominco's amended permit application.36 The State accepted the proposal, finding that it would decrease the
total output of nitrogen oxide at the mine "to a level comparable to that which
37
would result were SCR installed in only the [fifth and seventh] generators.
The initial permit determination
was then submitted to the EPA and circu38
lated for public comment.
At the close of the public comment period 39 in June 1999, the National
Park Service notified the State that the BACT determination for the Cominco
mine was improper. 40 First, the Park Service expressed concern that the nitrogen oxide emissions from the mine would harm native vegetation at a nearby
environmental preservation area.' Second, the Park Service argued that the
proposed offset provisions included in the BACT deternination were "neither
allowed by BACT, nor [would achieve] the degree of reduction that would
33. Alaska Dep't of EnvI. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 994-95. See also 42

U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000) (stating that the definition of BACT includes a calculation of
"energy, environmental, and economic impacts" in setting the appropriate technology).
34. Alaska Dep 't of Envil. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 995. Particularly, the State

found that Cominco had overstated the cost of SCR and that "SCR has been installed
on similar diesel-fired engines throughout the world," thus undercutting Cominco's
two primary arguments in opposition to SCR as BACT at the mine. Id.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Alaska Dep 't ofEnvtl. Conservation,298 F.3d at 817.
Alaska Dep 't of Envil. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 994. The state permitting

authority is required to provide notice to the EPA Administrator of each permit application and to give updated information any time the state takes any action on consideration of the permit. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d)(1) (2000).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (requiring a public notice and comment period
for the proposed permit "with opportunity for interested persons including representatives of the Administrator to appear and submit written or oral presentations on the air
quality impact of [the] source, alternatives thereto, control technology requirements,
and other appropriate considerations" before the permit may be issued).
40. Alaska Dep 't ofEnvIl. Conservation, 124 S.Ct. at 995.
41. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 298 F.3d at 817. The area that the Park
Service expressed concern about included the Cape Krusenstern National Monument

and Noatak National Preserve, located near the mine in northwest Alaska. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

5

1162

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 16
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

result
with SCR."42 Finally, the Park Service asserted that, because the
new project would "remove operating restrictions that the 1994 PSD permit
had placed on four of the existing generators," these generators should be
considered a part of the project and subjected to BACT requirements.4 3
The EPA first contacted the State in July, 1999, and issued a letter stating that the State's BACT determination was not reasonable in light of the
State's initial determination that SCR was BACT for the Cominco generators.44 The EPA asserted that "once it is determined that an emission unit is
subject to BACT, the PSD program does not allow the imposition of a limit
that is less stringent than BACT." 45 With respect to the offsetting proposal,
the EPA declared that "[n]ew emissions could be offset only against reduced
emissions from sources covered by the same BACT authorization." 46 Finally,
the EPA agreed with the Park Service that, due to the technology alterations
proposed for the older generators, these too would be subject to BACT in the
new permit.47
In response to the EPA's concerns, the State issued a second report in
September 1999, limiting its focus to the new generator but again asserting
that Low NOx was BACT for that generator.48 Although it did not conduct
any economic analysis on this issue, the State argued that SCR would impose
"a disproportionate cost on the mine. 4 9 The EPA again protested, noting that
the State had previously stated that SCR was both technically and economically feasible as BACT for the new generator and that there was no basis for
this change of opinion.50 However, the EPA did give the State and Cominco
the opportunity to submit financial data supporting its claim of economic
infeasibility. 5 l Cominco refused to submit the requested data, arguing, without specification, that it had high debts and asserting for the first5 2time that
Low NOx was needed "for industrial development in rural Alaska."

42. Alaska Dep't of Envil. Conservation,124 S. Ct. at 995-96.
43. Id. at 996.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The older Cominco generators were subject to a different initial technology control (Fuel Injection Timing Retard) which was less stringent that either Low
NOx or SCR. Id. at 995 n.8.
47. Id. at 996.
48. Id. The State abandoned the offsetting justification found in the first draft
report and agreed with the EPA that the older generators "could not be considered in
determining BACT for MG-17." Id. The State and Cominco subsequently agreed that
the older generators would be fitted with Low NOx. Id. at 996 n.9. The EPA did not
object to this arrangement, as there was no requirement that these generators implement BACT since this would not cause an increase in emissions. Id.
49. Id. at 996.
50. Id. at 996-97.
51. Id.at 997.
52. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/16
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On December 10, 1999, the State issued the permit and its final technical report, finding that Low NOx was BACT for the Cominco generator, but
again changing its rationale for this determination. 53 In the report, the State
specified that it made no judgment concerning the economic or technical
infeasibility of SCR, but instead asserted that SCR would have an "adverse
economic diversity
effect on the mine's unique and continuing impact on the 54
competitiveness."
world
venture's
the
on
and
region
of the
On the same day, the EPA issued its first order to the State "prohibiting
[the State] from issuing a PSD permit to Cominco unless [it] satisfactorily
documents why SCR is not BACT" and finding that the State's BACT deter'
mination and accompanying rationale were "both arbitrary and erroneous." 5
Since the State had already issued the PSD permit, the EPA issued a second
order on February 8, 2000, prohibiting construction or modification activities
at the mine.5 6 This order was later vacated by the EPA's third and final order
to the State issued on March 7, 2000. That order permitted minimal preconstruction activities to be conducted during the summer, but "generally' prohibited Cominco from acting on [the State's] December 10 PSD permit."
The State and Cominco initially petitioned the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the EPA's orders on February 8,
2000, the same day that the EPA issued its order to stop construction. 5 8 In
response to the petition, the EPA moved to dismiss, arguing that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the EPA's orders were not "final
agency action[s]." 59 The court rejected this argument, holding that the EPA
had "asserted its final position" on the matter by issuing the orders and that
"legal consequences [would] flow if Cominco [chose] to disregard the Order
and go forward with construction. '" The court then deferred consideration of
the merits of the case to allow the EPA the option of withdrawing its orders,
commencing an enforcement action in a district court, or submitting an administrative record to the court detailing the EPA's justifications for its or53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 998. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. United States EPA,
244 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2001).
59. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 244 F.3d at 749. The United States
Courts of Appeals have original jurisdiction only over "final action[s]" taken by the
EPA. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000).
60. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 244 F.3d at 750. In so holding, the
court applied the test for finality developed in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
In Bennett, the Court held that an agency has taken a final action where the action
"mark[s] the 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process" and is "one by
which 'rights or obligations have been determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will flow."' Id. at 177-78 (citations omitted).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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ders. 6 1 The62 EPA later submitted a declaration to the court that6the record was
complete./The State and Cominco agreed to this submission.63
In 2062, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit finally
resolved the merits of the case. 64 Both the State and Cominco claimed that the
EPA did not have authority to issue any of the underlying orders and that it
had "abused its discretion in finding that [the BACT] determination did not
comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act and Alaska's State Implementation Plan." Furthermore, the State argued that Section 169 author66
ized the State to use discretion in determining BACT.66 Thus, the EPA did
not have the right to unilaterally veto the State's decision based "on a mere
difference of opinion. ' '67 In response, the EPA asserted that the plain lan6
8
guage and legislative history of the Clean Air Act's enforcement provisions
gave the EPA the authority to force compliance with the PSD program where
the state has acted unreasonably in setting BACT.69 The EPA characterized
the State's BACT determination for the Cominco generator as "nothing short
of incomprehensible, unreasoned, and unsupported." 70
The court agreed with the EPA, holding that the "EPA has the ultimate
authority to decide whether the state has complied with the BACT requirements of the Act and the state SIP."'7 1 The court particularly emphasized that
a reasoned justification determining BACT was one of the "requirements"
that a state must follow in implementing the PSD program. 72 Where the state
"fail[s] to provide an adequate justification for its BACT decision," the EPA
is authorized to enforce the PSD provisions to ensure that the program is
properly implemented.73 Once the court resolved this initial matter, it went on
to hold that the EPA had not acted arbitrarily in issuing the orders 74 since the
61. Alaska Dep 't of Envtl. Conservation, 244 F.3d at 751.
62. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir.
2002), aff'd, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 816.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 820 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000)).
67. Id.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a)(5)(A), 7477 (2000). See supra notes 16-17 and
accompanying text.
69. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 298 F.3d at 818-19. The EPA asserted
that the State must give a reasoned justification for its BACT designation as one of
the requirements of the Act. Id.
70. Id. at 822.
71. Id. at 820.
72. Id. at 821.
73. Id. at 821-22.
74. "Under the Act, we may reverse a final action by the EPA if it is 'arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."' Id.
at 822 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2000)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/16
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State had not complied with the statutory requirements for determining
BACT and had acted irrationally in issuing the Cominco permit.75
Cominco and the State appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari to resolve the scope of the EPA's enforcement authority under the PSD program, an issue not previously addressed by the
76
courts. A majority of the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision, rejecting the theory advanced by the State and Cominco that the PSD program gave
the State broad discretion to adopt BACT and issue PSD permits. 77 The Court
held that where the State has made an arbitrary or erroneous BACT determination in issuing a PSD permit, the
•78 EPA is authorized to force compliance
with the PSD program's requirements.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In response to rising concerns with the quality of the nation's air and the
failure of the states to create a viable solution to the implicit health concerns
associated with dirty air, Congress federalized air pollution controls with the
1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.79 Prior to the 1970 Amendments,
regulation and implementation of air quality and pollution controls was
mostly left to the states. 80 State compliance with the minimal federal attempts
at regulation was extremely inconsistent. 81 As a result, "Congress reacted by
taking a stick to the States ' 82 and promulgating national ambient air quality
75. Id. In its discussion of the reasonableness of the State's BACT determination, the court detailed the "top-down approach" to determining BACT for a particular
source, which is the approach that the State purported to follow in this case. Id. Under
this approach, BACT technologies are ranked "in descending order of control effectiveness."Id. "The most stringent technology is BACT unless the applicant can show
that it is not technically feasible, or if energy, environmental, or economic impacts
justify a conclusion that it is not achievable." Id. Applying this formula, the court
found that SCR was, in fact, the most stringent control technology for the Cominco
generators and that neither the State nor Cominco had sufficiently demonstrated why
it was technically or economically infeasible. Id. at 822-23.
76. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983, 998 (2004).
77. Id. at 1000.
78. Id.
79. See SQUILLACE, supra note 5, at 47. The first attempt at federal control of air
quality was the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, designed to promote research of air
pollution by the federal government. Id. Congress later enacted the Clean Air Act of
1963, which provided limited federal jurisdiction to regulate interstate pollution. Id.
The last major federal action prior to the 1970 Amendments was the Air Quality Act
of 1967, which was the first law that actually "focused regulatory efforts on ambient
air quality." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing DAVID P. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS §
8.01 (1981)).
82. Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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standards ("NAAQS"). 8 3 The states had no choice but to implement the

NAAQS through a complex structure of federal regulations.8 4 Although the
states were given responsibility for implementing these air quality standards
through promulgation of State Implementation Plans ("SIPs"),85 Congress

clearly intended the EPA to oversee the states and ensure that the standards
were met.86 Fearing that the states might not comply with the Clean Air Act
in meeting the NAAQS, Congress specifically authorized the EPA to enforce
these provisions against the states through administrative orders and civil and
criminal penalties.
Through this structure, Congress laid the foundation for cooperative
federalism in environmental policy found in subsequent amendments to the
Clean Air Act.88 Despite these congressional mandates regarding the roles

that the states and the EPA are to play, courts have sometimes struggled with
the proper interpretation of the Act in deciding whether particular EPA enforcement actions are appropriate.
A. Preventionof SignificantDeterioration
Shortly after the 1970 Amendments were promulgated, an issue arose
regarding whether areas in which the air quality was better than required by
the EPA should be treated any differently than those areas in which the air
90
of
a group
Club
Ruckelshaus,
poor.89 InsuitSierra
was particularly
quality
asking
Administrator,
thev.EPA
against
activists brought
environmental
83. Id. at 64-65.
84. Id.

85. "Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality
within the entire geographic area comprising such State by submitting an implementation plan .... " 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2000)
("The Congress finds that... air pollution prevention ... and air pollution control at

its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments....").
86. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1976). The requirements in
the 1970 Amendments were "of a 'technology-forcing-character' . . . expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control devices that might at the
time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible." Id. at 257 (quoting
Train, 421 U.S. at 90).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2000) (listing a broad range of enforcement alternatives that the EPA can institute when a state does not comply with the provisions of
the Act).
88. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036 (7th Cir. 1984)
("[T]he Clean Air Act creates a partnership between the states and the federal government .... The federal government... determines the ends ... but Congress has

given the states the initiative and a broad responsibility regarding the means .... ").
89. See generally Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972),
affd per curiam without opinion, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. 20656 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
90. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/16
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the court to force the EPA to consider non-degradation of existing air quality
in approving any SIP. 91 The EPA had previously enacted regulations 92 that
would have allowed degradation of the existing air quality so long as the air
quality did not fall below the NAAQS.93 The EPA argued that the 1970
Amendments
did not require such consideration of the non-degradation of air
94
quality.

The court looked at the language and legislative history of Section
101(b)(1) 9' of the 1970 Amendments and determined that Congress had contemplated non-degradation of existing clean air as one of the purposes inherent in the Act. 96 "[The] language would appear to declare Congress' intent to
improve the quality of the nation's air and to prevent deterioration of that air
quality, no matter how presently pure that quality.., happens to be." 97 In
response to the court's decision, the EPA issued regulations preventing significant deterioration of the air in areas where the air quality exceeded the
minimum national standards.98
In the 1977 Amendments, Congress responded by enacting specific provisions to separately govern attainment and nonattainment areas located
within the several states. 99 Congress included "an express directive that state
plans include measures to prevent the significant deterioration of air quality
in areas . .

.

having ambient air quality better than the applicable

[NAAQS]."' 00 Congress enacted these provisions to preserve the existing air
quality in attainment areas and prevent deterioration to the minimum levels
established in the NAAQS.' 0 '
Alongside the environmental goals, Congress also tailored the PSD requirements to allow economic growth consistent with preventing significant

91. Id. at 254.

92. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(b) (1972).
93. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. at 254.
94. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970) (One of the basic purposes of the Act is "to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nations's air resources so as to promote the
public health and welfare.") (emphasis added). In the current Code, this language is
now found at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000).
96. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. at 255.
97. Id.
98. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974) (superseded); see also Ala. Power Co. v. Costle,
636 F.2d 323, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (The 1974 regulations required each SIP to be
revised to include PSD requirements.).
99. Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 349. "Nonattainment" areas are those regions in

which the air quality falls below the EPA's national air quality standards. See 42
U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000). A discussion of the regulations attendant to nonattainment areas is beyond the scope of this Note, but the provisions are located at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7501-15 (2000).
100. Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 349. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (2000).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1) (2000).
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deterioration in attainment areas. ° 2 In this manner, Congress hoped to "identify facilities which, due to their size, are financially able to bear the substantial regulatory costs imposed by the PSD provisions and which, as a group,
are primarily responsible for emission of the deleterious pollutants that befoul
our nation's air., 10 3 With this goal in mind, Congress gave the states a greater
role in deciding how best to effectuate the PSD requirements because the
states have more knowledge of local conditions and needs than the EPA
does.1 4 Although the Act clearly provides for an increased state role, the
legislative history of the PSD program also suggests a heightened need for
05
national guidelines to protect the ambient air from significant deterioration.'
According to the terms of the Act, the state permitting authority is the
agency authorized to review permit applications from major emitting facilities to ensure that emissions from those facilities will not significantly deteriorate the existing air quality. ° 6 The Act requires that all major emitting
facilities apply for a preconstruction permit from the state permitting authority before constructing a new facility or modifying an existing facility that
will increase emissions in the attainment area.' 0 7 The purpose of this process
is to prevent major emission releases into the ambient air prior to actual construction or modification.'l°
When the state permitting authority receives a preconstruction permit
application, it must evaluate two criteria before issuing a permit to construct
or modify a facility.109 First, the emissions must "not cause, or contribute to,
air pollution in excess of any... maximum allowable concentration" for any

102. Id. § 7470(3).
103. Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 353.

104. H.R. REP. No. 95-294 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1085.
105. Id. at 1213. The Report highlights Congressional concern with respect to this
issue:
Without national guidelines for the prevention of significant deterioration
a State deciding to protect its clean air resources will face a double threat.
The prospect is very real that such a State would lose existing industrial
plants to more permissive States. But additionally the State will likely become the target of "economic-environmental blackmail" from new industrial plants that will play one State off against another with threats to locate in whichever State adopts the most permissive pollution controls.
Id.

106. Id. at 1087 ("The permit program is to be operated by States. The purpose of
the permit is to assure that the allowable increments and allowable ceilings will not be
exceeded as a result of emissions from any new or modified major stationary
source."). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2000).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1); Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 350.
108. Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 353.

109. There are eight requirements that the permit applicant must demonstrate to
the state permitting authority. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(l)-(8). Full analysis of these
requirements is outside the scope of this Note.
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pollutant for which the area is an attainment area. 10° Second, the facility must
employ the best available control technology (BACT) for each pollutant emitted from the facility."' BACT requires the state permitting authority to ensure, on a case by case basis, "the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant [that is achievable by the facility] ... taking 112
into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.
The EPA has issued draft guidelines for determining which technology
is BACT for a new or modified facility. These guidelines are frequently relied
upon by state permitting agencies and the EPA.'1 3 The guidelines suggest a
"top-down" approach where applicants seeking a PSD permit must apply the
most stringent control technology unless they demonstrate that such technology is economically or technically infeasible. 114 Once it is determined that a
PSD applicant has met all of the statutory requirements, the state permitting
authority may issue the permit and construction or modification of the facility
may begin."15
B. EPA Oversight and Enforcement Authority Under the PSD Program
The Clean Air Act includes both general and specific federal enforcement provisions designed to give the EPA the ability to ensure that states are
complying with the mandates of the Act. 1 6 Section 113 gives the EPA the
authority to issue orders and seek civil and criminal penalties for violations of
the Clean Air Act.' 17 These general enforcement provisions specifically authorize the EPA to issue orders "prohibiting the construction or modification
of any major stationary source" where it finds that "a State is not acting in
compliance with any requirement or prohibition.., relating to the construction [or modification of such sources]."" 8 Under these provisions, the EPA

110. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3).
111. Id. § 7475(a)(4).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000).
113. See Sur Contra La Contaminacion v. EPA, 202 F.3d 443,446 (1st Cir. 2000).
The EPA guidelines were issued by the EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards in draft form in 1990 in a document entitled New Source Review Workshop
Manual, availableat http://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/gen/wkshpman.pdf.
114. See Citizens for Clean Air v. United States EPA, 959 F.2d 839, 845 (9th Cir.
1992).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a).
116. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7477 (2000).
117. See id. § 7413(a). These "general" provisions include a state's failure to
comply or enforce SIP requirements as enacted and a state's failure to comply with
permit programs. Id. § 7413(a)(1)-(2).
118. Id. § 7413(a)(5)(A). Congress strengthened the EPA's oversight and enforcement authority over the PSD program in the 1990 Amendments. Prior to these
Amendments, the EPA did not have authority under Section 7413(a) to issue orders
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may issue administrative penalty orders, seek civil action, or commence
criminal proceedings for noncompliance with the terms of the Act.' 19
Congress also included specific enforcement provisions tailored to the
PSD regulations in the Act that authorize the EPA to "take such measures,
including issuance of an order, or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary to
prevent the construction or modification of a major emitting facility which
does not conform to the [PSD] requirements.' 20 The plain language of the
statute makes clear that "before an enforcement action may be undertaken
there must be a violation" of the PSD requirements. 12 ' However, prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Alaska Departmentof Environmental Conservation v. EPA, it was unclear how far EPA enforcement authorization extended
under Section 167, as it was unclear what constituted a "violation" of the PSD
provisions.
In United States v. Solar Turbines, Inc., 2 the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether the EPA
could directly order a facility to halt construction for violation of the PSD
regulations when the state permitting authority had already issued a PSD
permit. 123 In looking at the structure of the Clean Air Act as a whole, the
court held that the EPA could not enforce an order directly against a facility
that was already operating under a permit, even if the permit violated the
state's SIP and the PSD provisions of the Act. 124 In so holding, the court
noted that "a violation is to be assessed against objective standards" such as
"the source's failure to apply for a permit" or its failure to submit information
requested by the state permitting authority.' 25 Despite this determination, the
court found that the EPA could have instituted an action immediately
against
126
permit.
invalid
an
issuing
for
authority
permitting
state
the
In Allsteel, Inc. v. United States EPA, 127 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit indirectly addressed this issue in dicta, finding that the issue of
whether the EPA could seek enforcement directly against a facility operating
under a PSD permit that was improperly authorized was an open question. 12 8
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted this difference of opinion
for non-compliance with the PSD provisions. See S. REP. No. 101-228 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3741.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5)(B)-(C).
120. Id. § 7477.
121. United States v.Solar Turbines, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 535, 539 (M.D. Pa. 1989).

122. Id.
123. Id. at 538.
124. Id. at 539.
125. Id. The court noted that the EPA's action in this case amounted to a "veto" of

the state permit, which was not authorized by the language of the PSD enforcement
provisions. Id.
126. Id. at 540.

127. 25 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 1994).
128. Id. at 315.
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in United States v. AM General Corporation,129 but determined that it did not
need to resolve the issue as the EPA had waited too long in seeking to enforce
the PSD provisions of the Act. 130 The court in AM General did note that
"[t]he primary responsibility for the Act's enforcement at the level of the
individual plant has been lodged in the states rather than in the national EPA,
so it would not be surprising if Congress did not equip the EPA with a complete quiver of enforcement arrows." 131 What was clear after AM General was
that the federal courts would not entertain an enforcement action under the
terms of Section 113 if the EPA delayed seeking such
enforcement until after
32
construction or modification of a facility had begun.
Despite the differing judicial views on this issue, the EPA has developed
its own interpretation regarding the proper scope of its oversight and enforcement authority under Section 167.133 The EPA has recognized that state
permitting agencies are to be granted considerable discretion in making
BACT determinations. 134 Accordingly, the EPA will not ordinarily "'second
guess' state decisions" regarding BACT for a particular facility. 35 The EPA
has also noted that, as the primary implementers of the PSD program, the
"[s]tates have been largely successful... and EPA's involvement in interpre' 36
tative and enforcement issues is limited to only a small number of cases."'
However, the EPA has also clarified its position that the state permitting authority must give "a reasoned justification of the basis for its [BACT] decision."'137 In this manner, the "EPA acts largely as a guarantor that the state
follow applicable procedures and not act arbitrarily" in making a proper
BACT determination for individual PSD applicants. 138 Under its interpretation of Section 167, the EPA would have the authority to ensure that state

129. 34 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1994).
130. See id. at 475.
131. Id.
132. Id. (noting that it would be extremely inequitable to allow an EPA enforcement order or civil penalties where the facility has already received a PSD permit and
completed plant modifications).
133. See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans;
Commonwealth of Virginia-Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program, 63
Fed. Reg. 13,795 (Mar. 23, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plan State of Texas Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 57 Fed. Reg. 28,093 (June 24, 1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
134. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 13,797.
135. Id.
136. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plan State of Texas Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 57 Fed. Reg. at 28,095.
137. Joint Appendix at 282, Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S.
Ct. 983, 1001 (2004) (No. 02-658).
138. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

15

1172

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 16
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 69

permitting authorities act justifiably in determining BACT for each major
emitting facility.
When confronted with official agency interpretations of statutes in
which Congress has delegated substantial regulatory authority to an agency,
the courts have traditionally applied the test first developed in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' 39 However, where
the agency's interpretation of a particular gap left in the statute is found in
internal guidelines or memoranda that have not been subjected to the processes attendant to formal rulemaking, traditional Chevron analysis is not applicable.140 Rather, such agency interpretations are "'entitled to respect' . ..
but only to the extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade."",14 1 The courts recognize that agencies are specialists in the field in
which they regulate whereas judges typically do not have such specialized
42
knowledge.
Given the EPA's internal interpretation of its enforcement powers under
the Clean Air Act and the lack of case law on the issue, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Alaska Department of Conservation v.
EPA to determine the proper scope of EPA enforcement authority, particularly with respect to ensuring that state permitting authorities act reasonably
in determining BACT.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA,143 the
United States Supreme Court clarified the respective roles of the states and
the EPA in implementing and enforcing the provisions of the PSD program.144 The issue the Court addressed was "whether EPA's oversight role,

139. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under this test, the court first asks whether Congress
has specifically addressed the question at issue in the case. Id. at 842. If so, the court
will apply the Congressional mandate to the particular issue in dispute. Id. at 842-43.
If Congress has not specifically spoken to the issue, leaving a gap to be filled by the
regulatory agency, the "the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute" but looks at "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
140. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (ruling that
"interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law[,] do not warrant Chevron-style deference").
141. Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). Accord
Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537
U.S. 371, 385 (2003) (noting that "[w]hile these administrative interpretations are not
products of formal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect").
142. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (2004).
143. 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004).
144. Id. at 1002.
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described by Congress in [Sections) 113(a)(5) and 167, extends to ensuring
that a state permitting authority's BACT determination is reasonable in light
of the statutory guides."' 145 In an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, 146 a

majority of the Court held that the "EPA has supervisory authority over the
reasonableness of state permitting authorities' BACT determinations and may
issue a stop construction order, under [Sections] 113(a)(5) and 167, if a
BACT selection is not reasonable.' 47
A. The Majority Opinion
The Court began its discussion by addressing the jurisdictional claim
raised by the EPA. 148 The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, finding that the EPA's orders to the State and Cominco were
"final agency actions" subject to review under the test enunciated in Bennett
v. Spear.149 Because the EPA had stated its final position in the orders and the
orders created legal obligations for Cominco in that they prohibited construction at the mine, the Court determined that it had proper jurisdiction to hear
the claim.5 0
Next, the Court analyzed the requirements of the statutory PSD provisions and the enforcement mechanisms granted to the EPA therein.' ' The
Court first found that, according to the language of Section 169(3), the State
was the authority initially responsible for determining BACT for Cominco's
proposed generator.152 However, the Court also noted that the EPA "may
issue an order to stop a facility's construction if a PSD permit contains no
BACT designation.' ' 153 Left with the question of what the Act requires in
cases where the permit contains a BACT designation that the EPA believes to
be unreasonable, the Court found that the EPA's construction of the BACT
requirements and its interpretation of the proper scope of its enforcement
54
authority in relation to these requirements were appropriate.

145. Id. at 999 (citation omitted).
146. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer joined the majority opinion.
147. Alaska Dep 't of Envt. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 1009.

148. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. The EPA raised the same
claim that it had raised before the Court of Appeals, namely that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the orders issued to the State were not "final
agency actions" as required by 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S.Ct. at 998.
149. Id. at 998-99 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)). See
supra note 60 and accompanying text.
150. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 998.

151. Id. at 999.
152. Id; see supranote 112 and accompanying text.
153. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 999-1000.
154. Id. at 1000.
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The EPA had argued that the proper interpretation of the BACT provisions required the state permitting authority to make "not simply a BACT
designation, but a determination of BACT faithful to the statute's definition. ' ' 55 In this manner, the discretion accorded to state permitting authorities
is constrained by the language of the Act, as it only grants the "authority to
make reasonableBACT determinations." ' 56 From this interpretation, the EPA
argued that Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 gave it the
authority "to check a state
157
agency's unreasonably lax BACT designation."'
In analyzing the arguments advanced by the EPA, the Court noted that
the EPA's interpretation of the PSD provisions and its enforcement role
therein were consistent with prior interpretations found "in interpretive guides
the Agency has several times published."'' 58 Because these interpretations
were published in internal guidance memoranda and not subjected to formal
rulemaking requirements, the Court found that such interpretations could not
be given dispositive effect under Chevron.' 59 However, the Court determined
that even if such interpretations are found in internal memoranda or agency
manuals, if they are credible, these interpretations "'nevertheless warrant
respect. '' 6 As such, the Court decided that the EPA's interpretation of both
the BACT requirements of the PSD program and the proper scope
of its en6
forcement authority under the Act were entitled to some respect.1 '
The Court next addressed the three primary opposing arguments advanced by the State.' 62 First, the State argued that the plain language of Section 169(3) 163 gave it sole discretion to designate BACT for a particular facility and that the EPA's sole oversight and enforcement role was to ensure that
the State make a BACT designation. 164 The Court rejected this argument,
stating that Congress did not intend to give state permitting authorities unfettered discretion in making BACT determinations. 65 The Court noted that the
EPA's interpretation of the statute did not undercut the states' ability to make
initial BACT designations, as the "EPA claim[ed] no prerogative to designate
the correct BACT . . . [and] assert[ed] only the authority to guard against

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.at 1001.
159. Id. (citing Christiensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
160. Id.(quoting Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003)).
161. Id.
162. See id.
at 1001-06.
163. See supranote 112 and accompanying text.
164. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
165. Id.at 1002 ("[T]he fact that the relevant statutory guides... may not yield a
single, objectively correct BACT determination surely does not signify that there can
be no unreasonabledeterminations.") Id. (citation omitted).
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unreasonable designations.' 66 Furthermore, the Court found that Congress
had "expressly endorsed an expansive surveillance role for EPA" in Sections
113(a)(5) and 167.167
Second, the State argued that if Congress intended to give the EPA the
authority to enforce the provisions of the Clean Air Act, it would have done
so in unambiguous terms. 168 The Court rejected this argument, determining
that the State had misunderstood the "difference between a statutory require' 69 The Court
ment and a statutory authorization."'
found that Congress intended to require EPA approval only in certain limited circumstances, but
that this did not undercut Congress's authorization of EPA oversight and
enforcement in ensuring that
7 BACT designations are reasonably made by
state permitting authorities. 1
Third, the State argued that even if the EPA's interpretation was correct,
the proper forum for enforcement was through state, not federal, administrative review boards and courts.' 7' The State expressed concern that if the
EPA's interpretation was correct, a BACT determination made by the state
permitting authority could be invalidated by the EPA at any time, even after a
permit had been issued and construction begun. 172 In response, the Court first
noted that "[i]t would be unusual, to say the least, for Congress to remit a
federal agency enforcing federal law solely to state court."' 71 Moreover, the
Court found that the enforcement provisions of the PSD program did not discuss or require recourse to state administrative
or judicial forums by the EPA
74
in taking corrective action under the statute. 1
The Court also determined that the State's practical concerns were unfounded as federal courts would have to undertake the same inquiry as state
166. Id. at 1002. The Court also noted that the EPA's interpretation of the statute
gave the state permitting authorities "considerable leeway" in making BACT designations, as the EPA specifically disclaimed any "intention to 'second guess' state decisions." Id. at 1003 (quoting Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Commonwealth of Virginia-Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,795, 13,797 (Mar. 23, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52)).
167. Id. at 1002-03.
168. Id. at 1003. Fundamentally, the State argued that "[h]ad Congress intended
EPA superintendence of BACT determinations, . . . Congress would have said so

expressly by mandating Agency approval of all, not merely some, BACT determinations." Id.

169. Id. (citation omitted).
170. Id. "Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 sensibly do not require EPA approval of all
state BACT determinations, they simply authorize EPA to act in the unusual case in
which a state permitting authority has determined BACT arbitrarily." Id.
171. Id. at 1003-04. The State suggested that state forums were appropriate to
ensure an adequate factual record, put the burden of persuasion on the EPA when
making a challenge, and promote certainty in the final determination of the issue. Id.
172. Id. at 1004.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a)(5), 7477 (2000)).
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courts in determining whether the state's BACT designation was reasonable
in light of the surrounding circumstances. 17 In response to the State's concern that federal enforcement of BACT designations would allow EPA invalidation after construction had begun, the Court found that in the one instance where the EPA attempted such a tardy invalidation, its enforcement
proceeding was dismissed. 176 The Court also noted that the EPA itself recognized the necessity of acting in a timely77fashion and acted in accordance with
this understanding in the case at hand. 1
Having determined that the EPA's interpretation of the PSD program
was correct, the Court next turned to the question of whether the EPA had
properly exercised its enforcement authority in the instant case.' 78 The Court
applied the standard of judicial review found in the Administrative Procedure
Act,179 which requires the Court to decide "whether the Agency's action was
'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."" 80 Applying this standard, the Court held that the EPA had not
acted arbitrarily in issuing its orders because the State made an unreasonable
and erroneous BACT designation by issuing the PSD permit to Cominco."'
The Court primarily focused on the fact that the State had initially designated Selective Catalyst Reduction ("SCR") as BACT for the Cominco
generator using the top-down approach suggested by the EPA but then
changed its BACT determination without a factual basis for the modification. 82 The Court was not persuaded by any of the arguments advanced by
the State and Cominco concerning the economic or technical infeasibility of
applying SCR to the generator because Cominco had never submitted any
information detailing why this technology was infeasible. 183 As the Court
noted, the State had initially determined that SCR was well within the range
175. Id. at 1004-05. In making this determination, the Court held:
[I]n either an EPA-initiated civil action or a challenge to an EPA stopconstruction order filed in state or federal court, the production and persuasion burdens remain with EPA and the underlying question a reviewing court resolves remains the same: Whether the state agency's BACT
determination was reasonable, in light of the statutory guides and the state
administrative record.
Id. at 1005.
176. Id. at 1005-06 (citing United States v. AM Gen. Corp., 34 F.3d 472, 475 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
177. Id. at 1006.
178. Id.
179. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
180. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 1006 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (2000)). The Court applied this standard because the Clean Air Act does
not specify a judicial review standard applicable to the instant dispute. Id.
181. Id. at 1006-07.
182. Id. at 1007-08.
183. Id.
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that "[the State] and EPA considers economically feasible."' 8 4 The Court
found that no subsequent factual developments called this determination into
question.' 85 However, the Court carefully emphasized that the State was free
to revisit the BACT determination and allow the less stringent Low NOx
technology if it could accurately justify why SCR was not BACT for the
Cominco generator.'86
B. The Dissent
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kennedy 187 framed the issue as one in
which the EPA "sought to overturn the State's decision, not by the process of
judicial review, but by administrative fiat."'' 8 8 From this perspective, the dissenting Justices criticized the majority's holding as inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act, reasoned principles of administrative
law, and established principles of federalism. 89 The dissent argued that the
EPA exceeded its authority by "vetoing" the State's designation of BACT for
190
the Cominco generator.
First, Justice Kennedy focused on the plain language of the PSD provisions, finding that the state permitting authority was the entity designated by
Congress to make BACT determinations. 191 According to the dissent, "[t]o
'determine' is not simply to make an initial recommendation that can later' ' be
92
overturned. It is 'to decide or settle... conclusively and authoritatively."
Applying this language, the dissenting Justices would hold that where a state
permitting authority has complied with the preconstruction requirements of
the Act, the EPA does not have a proper supervisory role over the state's discretionary decision.193 Moreover, the dissent found that the State had complied with all relevant statutory mandates as there was no allegation
that Low
94
NOx technology would violate any of the PSD requirements. 1
Justice Kennedy criticized the majority's support of the EPA's fundamental distrust of state agencies that, according to the legislative history of
the Clean Air Act, are the authorities primarily responsible for controlling air
184. Id. at 1008.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1009.
187. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in the dissenting opinion.
188. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1016 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000)).
192. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 495
(4th ed. 2000)) (alteration in original).
193. Id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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pollution. 95 He stated that "Congress made the overriding judgment that
States are more responsive to local conditions and can strike the right balance
between preserving environmental quality and advancing competing objectives.' 196 Justice Kennedy also suggested that there was no reason for the
EPA to distrust state agencies' willingness to implement the requirements of
the PSD program, as there is an "established presumption that States act 1in
Act. 97
good faith" in complying with federal mandates such as the Clean Air
Thus, he argued, there was no basis for the majority's purported concern
about a "race to the bottom" in which states would compete for more lenient
emissions rates absent extensive EPA oversight.' 9
Second, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority's holding as inconsistent with the statutory guidelines regarding proper judicial review of decisions made by the state permitting agencies. 199 The dissent argued that the
proper forum for such review was through state administrative review boards
200
and state courts. Justice Kennedy also noted that the statute requires states
to develop administrative processes in their SIPs for "interested persons,"
including the EPA, to comment on proposed BACT designations. 20' By allowing the EPA to bypass the state review forum, the majority shifted the
burden of persuasion to the states.20 2 Justice Kennedy argued that this was
inconsistent with Congress's intent to structure the PSD program with the
states as the primary entities charged with implementing the statutory re203
"[t]his end run around the
According to Justice Kennedy,
quirements.
'2 4
State's process is sure to undermine it. 0
195. Id. at 1012 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755
(1999)).
198. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1013-14 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As articulated by the dissent, "EPA,
the federal agency charged only with the [Clean Air Act's] implementation, has no
roving commission to ferret out arbitrary and capricious conduct by state agencies ....
That task is left to state courts." Id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 276 (1997)).
201. Id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (2000)
(requiring, as part of the state agency's preconstruction review, a notice and comment
period in which all "interested persons" are entitled to express relevant concerns).
202. Alaska Dep't of Envil. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 1014 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also agreed with the State
respecting their concern that allowing the EPA to intervene and veto the state permitting authority's BACT designation, while bypassing the state review forum, created
the possibility that the EPA could attempt to invalidate a permit at any point in time,
even years after the permit was initially issued and the facility had completed construction. Id. at 1016 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). According to Kennedy, this was a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/16
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Finally, Justice Kennedy critiqued the majority's holding as fundamentally inconsistent with established principles of federalism. 20 5 The dissent first
expressed concern that, under the majority's holding, the EPA could intervene in any dispute commenced in state court2 °6 where it disagreed with the

state court's final decision regarding proper BACT determinations. 207 Accordingly, "decisions by state courts would be subject to being overturned,
not just by any agency, but by an agency established by a different sovereign., 20 8 The dissent argued that such a result is fundamentally inconsistent
with notions of federalism. 20 9 According to Justice Kennedy, "[ijf, by some
course of reasoning, state courts must live with the insult that their judgments
can be revised by a federal agency, the Court should at least insist upon a
clear instruction from Congress., 2 0 The dissent found that such a clear instruction did not
exist in the explicit language and legislative history of the
2 11

Clean Air Act.

V. COMMENT
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation v. EPA serves to clarify the EPA's role in en-

forcing the PSD requirements of the Clean Air Act. As acknowledged by the
EPA itself, so long as the state does not act unreasonably in determining
BACT, the EPA must respect the state's decision regarding whether a particular construction permit should issue under the PSD permitting requirements. 2 12 However, where the state has acted arbitrarily or erroneously in
determining BACT, the EPA does have the authority to enforce the mandates
of the PSD program to ensure that attainment areas continue to exceed national ambient air quality standards. Were the EPA not given this authority,
the states would be allowed to skirt the requirements of the Act, eventually
causing deterioration of the ambient air quality in attainment areas. This
would entirely frustrate the purposes underlying the Clean Air Act.
particularly valid concern as "'the United States are not bound by any statute of limitations."' Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338,
344 (1888)).
205. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206. As noted above, the dissent read the public notice and comment provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) to require states to establish administrative and judicial forums
where disputes regarding BACT designations may be heard. See id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 1002 ("EPA claims no prerogative to designate the correct BACT;
the Agency asserts only the authority to guard against unreasonable designations.").
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First, it is important to note that the Supreme Court's decision in Alaska
Department ofEnvironmental Conservationv. EPA is essentially a manifestation of the "hard look" doctrine 21 3 initially endorsed by the Court in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.214 In Overton Park, the Court found that,
under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts reviewing an agency decision
must take a "hard look" at the underlying facts supporting the agency's decision to determine whether the agency acted reasonably and in accordance
with statutory mandates. 215 Although Overton Park was primarily concerned
with the proper scope of judicial review of an underlying agency decision, the
rationale employed by the Court is applicable to the holding in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation as well. With respect to EPA oversight and enforcement of the PSD provisions, the Court made it clear that the
EPA must take a "hard look" at the state permitting authority's BACT designation to ensure that the state has acted reasonably as required by the terms of
the Act.216 Through this "hard look" review, the EPA can ensure that the
states fulfill their statutory obligations under the PSD permitting program in a
manner that accomplishes Congress's goals of protecting the quality of air in
attainment areas.
Second, the Court's holding in Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation accurately resolves the specific problem that Congress was
trying to alleviate in implementing the PSD program. Although the states are
given the primary responsibility for implementing the PSD program, 2 17 Congress surely did not intend to give the states unfettered discretion in choosing
lax technological controls. If Congress intended to give the states such control, it would not have explicitly mandated that the best available control
technology be implemented at newly constructed or modified facilities.
The underlying facts of the instant case accurately depict the anomaly
that would result if the states were given unfettered discretion in determining
BACT and the EPA was not allowed to oversee and enforce the PSD program. Although it is not entirely clear why the State backed away from its
initial determination that SCR was BACT for the Cominco generator, it is
apparent that neither the State nor Cominco gave a reasoned justification for
refusing to use this technology. Even after the EPA gave Cominco the chance
213. The phrase "hard look" review was originally coined by Judge Harold Leventhal in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970). In GreaterBoston Television, Judge Leventhal first suggested that the function
of a reviewing court was "to intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies...
but more broadly if the court becomes aware ... that the agency has not really taken a
'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making." Id. (footnote omitted).
214. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
215. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1964)).
216. Alaska Dep 't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 1009.
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/16

24

Foster: Foster: EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology:
EPA OVERSIGHT OFBA CT
2004]

to submit documentation detailing their particular economic and technological needs, it tendered no documentation and changed its justification for Low
NOx as BACT on three different occasions. Contrary to the dissent's position, the EPA never suggested that it was trying to "unilaterally veto" the
State's BACT determination. Rather, it was simply trying to get a reasonable
explanation from the State as to why Cominco could not use or afford the
more stringent technology. In fact, the EPA acknowledged that if the State
had submitted documentation or other support for its position that Low NOx
was BACT for the generator, it would have 2allowed
the State to proceed with
18
the PSD permit without further interference.
Congress clearly had such concerns in mind as it provided the EPA with
specific authority to oversee 2 19 and enforce 22 the PSD requirements. Congress included Sections 113(a)(5) and 177 expressly to guarantee that the
EPA had a role in ensuring that the states comply with the requirements of the
Act. Although the dissent argued that the notice and comment requirements
of Section 165(a)(2) require state courts and administrative boards to be the
exclusive arena for enforcement of the PSD program, the plain language of
this provision clearly does not suggest such a result. Furthermore, as the majority pointed out, it would be odd for Congress to relegate the EPA to the
state courts as the exclusive vehicle to enforce a federal statute. 22 1 It would be
even more bizarre in this case, where the statute was implemented to solve an
overarching national concern with ambient air quality and the public health
and welfare.
Third, and similar to other provisions of the Clean Air Act, Congress
created a structure of cooperative federalism within the PSD program. Congress's goal was to prevent the "race to the bottom" that would result if states
were given unwavering discretion in deciding the terms under which a PSD
permit should issue.222 The concern expressed by proponents of the "race to
the bottom" theory is that, absent uniform national standards, states would
engage in a race to lure lucrative industries within their borders, thereby sacrificing environmental quality for economic benefits. 223 Although there is
218. Alaska Dep 't of Envt. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 1003.
219. This oversight authority is specifically granted through the notice and comment provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (2000), which requires an update to the
EPA Administrator any time action is taken with respect to a PSD permit.

220. See 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (2000).
221. See Alaska Dep "t ofEnvtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 1004.
222. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (2000); Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323,

349 (D.C.

Cir. 1979); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 85 (2003) ("A driving force behind the [Act] was
the historic failure of state programs to control air quality and the consequent fear
that, absent national standards, states might be willing to sacrifice air quality for economic growth.").
223. See

HENRY
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R.
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17-18 (1996). Specifically with respect to the PSD
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some debate about whether a "race to the bottom" would actually occur absent uniform standards, it is clear that Congress had these fears in mind when
implementing the Clean Air Act.224 Otherwise, Congress would have either
created a statutory system under which the EPA had no federal oversight or
enforcement authority or not regulated ambient air quality at all. 225 Thus, the
Supreme Court's decision in Alaska Department of Environmental Conserva-

tion v. EPA was very much in accordance with Congress's intent in enacting
the PSD provisions of the Clean Air Act.

VI. CONCLUSION
In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, the

United States Supreme Court held that the EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state permitting authorities' BACT determinations under the
PSD program of the Clean Air Act. 226 The Court further held that the EPA
has the authority to issue stop construction orders if it reasonably believes
that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. 227 In so holding, the
Court not only clarified the scope of the EPA's enforcement authority under
the Act, but it also ensured that Congress's intent underlying the statutory
PSD provisions was effectuated. In an effort to prevent the "race to the bottom" feared by Congress, the Supreme Court in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservationreached the correct conclusion.

JENNIFER A. DAVIS FOSTER

permitting program, if the EPA had no enforcement ability, the states would not have
an adequate incentive to develop new technologies to prevent air pollution concerns.
This would decrease motivation for innovation and help to encourage the "race to the
bottom."
224. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supranote 222, at 85; see Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationalefor
FederalEnvironmental Regulation, in FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 169, 169-70 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997) (critiquing the "race-to-thebottom" theory, but recognizing that it is a preeminent justification for federal environmental regulation).
225. See Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 346.
226. Alaska Dep 't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S.Ct. at 1000.
227. Id.
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